

SEEKING THE ENEMY: HAVE WE GOT IT RIGHT?

**A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

Seeing the Enemy: Have We Got It Right? By Major Anthony K. Crawford, USA, 51 pages.

An unstable global environment where the threat is ambiguous requires warfighters to recognize the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy. This monograph provides an alternative definition which emphasizes the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy and the commander's role. Accentuating the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy is important to mission execution and the development of Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

This monograph examines the evolution and execution of Army doctrine during both combat and simulated combat operations to establish that there is a difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The author uses the 24th Infantry Division's Task Force Smith and the 1st Marine Division's performance during the Korean War to demonstrate how seeing and understanding the enemy impacts on massing combat power at the decisive point. The monograph presents the argument that reoccurring training issues experienced at the Combat Training Centers are linked to the warfighter's inability to acknowledge the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy.


Finally, the monograph analyzes technology's impact on the Army's ability to see and understand the enemy. Realizing that modern technology improves the commander's ability to see the enemy, the author then focuses on determining whether seeing the enemy is enough. Deployment demands and a wide variety of potential threats require the warfighter to recognize the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The difference is vital to mission accomplishment.


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
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Chapter One: Introduction

Army doctrine, contemporary military writing, and thought have diluted the great military theorists' understanding of seeing the enemy and the commander's role in seeing the enemy by not accentuating the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy. If seeing the enemy is to mean something, the Army's definition must include words like analysis, synthesis, evaluation, and commander involvement, all of which are important for understanding the enemy.

In an unstable global environment where the threat is ambiguous, just knowing the threat's capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities is not enough. Failing to recognize and consider the difference and interrelationship of knowing and understanding the enemy will permit the warfighter to further remove himself from the intelligence process.

First, this monograph will provide an alternative definition which emphasizes the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy. This definition is based on the great military theorists' imperative - that understanding is vital to the execution of all military operations. It is important that warfighters understand the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy in order to improve mission execution and establish the commander's role in the intelligence process. An examination of Army doctrine during war and stability operations demonstrates that there is a difference and a linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. Finally, this monograph will analyze technology's impact on the Army's ability to see and understand the enemy.

The success of Army operations and the massing of combat power at the decisive point is linked to the commander's ability to see the enemy in terms of time, space, and purpose in relationship to his forces. Seeing the enemy is an important step in massing combat power at the decisive point, but the phrase seeing the enemy and its definition have become a panacea for warfighters.

Military theorists, such as Sun Tzu, Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini believed that seeing the enemy was more than just knowing the enemy's capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities. These theorists were instrumental in defining and expressing the commander's role in the intelligence process. They expressed the difference between seeing and understanding by emphasizing the commander's involvement in the analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of information.

Napoleon said "that a general who has to see things through the eyes of another will never be able to command an army as it should be commanded"¹. Napoleon attempted to convey to leaders that it is a general or leader, by virtue of their experience, knowledge, and studies, are the people that have to provide meaning to all information. Therefore, the general or leader must possess the ability to synthesize, analyze, and evaluate information. If the general relies on others to perform these critical tasks he will become paralyzed during battle as he awaits for others to analyze and recommend for him.

In 1993, the Army published Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, which was one of the Army's first attempts at conceptualizing the importance of seeing the enemy. The authors of FM 100-5 coined the term "Battle Command" which incorporated visualizing

the current and future state of both the enemy and friendly forces in order to determine the commander's concept of the operations to accomplish the mission.² The term "visualization" was included in the 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, but it was not until the publication of the 1994 *Battle Command Pamphlet (Draft 2.1)*, "Leadership and Decision Making For War and Operations Other Than War", that seeing the enemy was defined. Since the publication of this pamphlet much thought has been given to defining what it means to see the enemy. "Seeing the enemy is the result of knowing their capabilities and limitations; identifying enemy strengths and weaknesses; and integrating the threat with terrain and your mission."³ FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, the tactical intelligence officer's capstone manual, does not make reference to or offer an explanation of seeing the enemy.

Realizing that modern technology may improve the commander's ability to see the enemy, the question then becomes is seeing the enemy enough, and what is the relationship between seeing the enemy and understanding the enemy. Is there a linkage between the commander's understanding of the enemy and mission execution? What role, if any, does the commander and technology play in enhancing or impeding his understanding of the enemy? An examination of Army doctrine, contemporary military writing, and thought infers that perhaps there is no difference between seeing the enemy and understanding the enemy, but the Army's warfighting record at the tactical level during war and simulated combat training exercises proves otherwise.

Current deployment demands and the wide variety of potential threats indicate that the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy be recognized. The

difference is vital to mission accomplishment. In an effort to reduce uncertainty on the modern battlefield the Army is placing great emphasis on technology and battlefield situational awareness to help the commander achieve the desired effects of combat power. Technology alone will not allow the commander to “understand the enemy.”

Chapter Two: Seeing the Enemy, Historical Context, and the Commander's

Role

*"To draw the truth from this mass of chaotic reports there is something vouchsafed only to a superior - understanding; mediocre ones are lost therein, they tend to believe that the enemy is here rather than there, and proceed to evaluate available reports in accordance with their wishes."*⁴

The phrase seeing the enemy is widely used at the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTCs) during unit After Action Reviews to discuss the Art of Battle Command. The phrase describes the intellectual visualization that Senior Observer Controllers at the Combat Training Centers believe tactical commanders should possess during mission planning, preparation, and execution. The 1994 *Battle Command Pamphlet (Draft 2.1)*, "Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War", was the first military document that attempted to conceptualize and define seeing the enemy.

According to the *Battle Command Pamphlet (Draft 2.1)*, seeing the enemy is a subcomponent of visualization - "the act of forming a mental picture of the current and future state based on higher commander's intent, available information, and intuition."⁵ The pamphlet attempts to define seeing the enemy but only in the sense of suggesting how it is achieved. Seeing the enemy "is the result of knowing their capabilities and limitations; identifying enemy strengths; weaknesses; attacking enemy weakness and avoiding enemy strengths; and integrating the threat with terrain and your mission."⁶

FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (1994), acknowledges the importance of knowing the enemy's capabilities and limitations. This is significant to the

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Process (IPB) but does not define seeing the enemy. Without a clear definition of seeing the enemy the phrase has become nothing more than a cliché. The failure to define seeing the enemy has continually hindered tactical forces during mission execution.

In an effort to provide an alternative definition that means something to the warfighter consideration should be given to what both the *Battle Command* Pamphlet and FM 34-130 have in common - the term *knowing*. The term knowing as used by both documents infers that knowing and understanding are the same. Knowing versus understanding; is there a difference?

Knowing is "having or reflecting knowledge, information, or insight: marked by understanding and intelligence."⁷ The *Battle Command Pamphlet (Draft 2.1)* defines knowledge as "involving the recall of specific facts, methods, processes, settings, or theories."⁸ This definition coincides with Benjamin S. Bloom's definition of knowledge in his book *The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*. Bloom refers to knowledge as the recalling of previously learned material. The information recalled may be specific facts to complete theories, but all that is required is the bringing to mind of the appropriate information. Knowledge represents the lowest level of learning in the cognitive domain.⁹ Knowledge in this sense is nothing more than knowing the enemy's doctrine, capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities. Whereas, understanding is derived from analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating what is known and observed. It is comprehending, discerning, and interpreting.¹⁰

The fundamental difference between knowing and understanding is that understanding requires a person to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate information. Understanding requires critical thinking and emerges from applying experience and studies to information.¹¹ Understanding is essential for anticipating future actions and events. The Army's battle command tenets - judgment and intuition support this distinction.

Judgment and intuition suggest that a person is not only aware of a given situation (to know), but that they understand how the situation or information impacts on the tactical situation. In the absence of information, facts, and perfect knowledge, the commander is required to make a decision on the basis of his understanding of the tactical situation.

The commander's understanding of the threat is based on tactical experience, knowledge of the enemy and friendly forces; the analysis, synthesis, comprehension, and evaluation of information, his study of history, and his evaluation of the enemy in relationship to his forces in time, space, and purpose. This is the essence of understanding. Seeing the enemy is the first step to understanding and thus a component of understanding.

The Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-100-1, "Leadership and Command on the Battlefield", advocates that the commander must develop the ability through training to synthesize information and anticipate potential threat courses of action (COAs) or outcomes to maintain the initiative.¹² The TRADOC pamphlet acknowledges the difference between knowing and understanding by introducing the word "synthesis"

into the Art of Battle Command. Words such as synthesis, analysis, comprehension, and evaluation used in defining understanding infer that there is a distinction between knowing and understanding.

Expert battle commanders are expected to operate at the synthesis and evaluation levels. Analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating are essential to visualization and conceptualizing and are critical for the development of commander's intent and COA development.¹³ According to Bloom, "learning outcomes in this area are the highest in the cognitive hierarchy because they contain elements of knowledge, comprehension, and application plus conscious value judgments based on clearly defined criteria."¹⁴ The Army's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) manuals have not considered the distinction between knowing and understanding.

FM 34-8, *Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence*, is the only document that articulates that threat COA development is a joint effort between the S2 and the commander. The manual suggests that the commander verifies that the threat COAs make sense given the enemy's situation and his knowledge of the threat's TTPs. To ensure that the threat COAs make sense the manual recommends that the commander answer the following question: if he was the threat's S3 or G3 would he present this COA to his commander.¹⁵ Commander involvement during threat COA development prior to and during the war gaming session ensures that the unit gets the most out of the orders process.

An orders process based on a lack of understanding of the threat is a precursor for failed operations during execution. Orders processes conducted on the basis of a faulty

understanding of the threat could result in the failure of the unit to identify both the friendly and threat commander's decision points, high value targets and artillery triggers, and named areas of interest. All of which have a negative impact on initiative, momentum, and exploitation.

The expanded role of the Army and the continual degradation of modern nation-states makes understanding the threat all the more critical because the Army no longer has a singular threat, threat model, or doctrinal template to use in preparation for the next war or stability operation. Today, as well as in the future, tactical commanders must consider the social, economic and political aspects, as well as command, control, communications, information, and cultural aspects of threat forces, to determine the linkage of these factors to the emerging threat COAs and centers of gravity. Seeing without understanding is not enough.

The Theorists

Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Jomini in their works on intelligence and command provide the tactical commander a perspective on the difference between knowing and understanding the enemy that remains relevant today as the Army attempts to define seeing the enemy.

Sun Tzu in his book *The Art of War*, professed that winning without fighting is the acme of generalship and the objective of tactics is to manipulate your enemy so that you can create the opportunity to apply maximum combat power at the decisive point.¹⁶ In order to manipulate the enemy, the prince or the general must understand what it is the enemy expects to see. Sun Tzu's phrase "know the enemy, terrain, and yourself" has not

been analyzed properly and is often misinterpreted in today's contemporary military writing. A cursory reading of Sun Tzu's, *The Art of War*, leads the reader to believe that knowing the enemy is the same as understanding. This is not correct.

The distinction between knowing and understanding the enemy becomes clear in Sun Tzu's views on the employment of spies. Knowing the enemy for Sun Tzu was nothing more than advanced knowledge. "The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was advanced knowledge."¹⁷ In today's terminology advanced knowledge connotes battlefield situational awareness.¹⁸ Realizing that the enemy would use spies to gain advanced knowledge on his intentions and forces, Sun Tzu advocated that the prince or general possess a thorough understanding of the enemy before the receipt of any information from the spy in order to discern truth from enemy deception. The prince or general's experience, judgment, and knowledge of the enemy allows them to make deductions about the enemy based on the spy's information.

Sun Tzu links knowledge, wisdom, and analysis to understanding. Knowledge and understanding are the foundations of wisdom. For Sun Tzu wisdom is what allows the prince or general to determine when, where, and how to destroy the enemy. The merger of advanced knowledge and wisdom in the prince and general's mind produces understanding.¹⁹

Carl von Clausewitz in *On War* expanded on Sun Tzu's distinction between knowing and understanding the enemy by highlighting the importance of intelligence to mission execution and the commander's role in the analysis of information. According to

Clausewitz, in battle all information is late, wrong, and useless. This is why understanding the enemy becomes essential.²⁰ Intelligence for Clausewitz, was “every sort of information about the enemy and his country the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.”²¹ Information in this sense is knowledge, the lowest level of learning in the cognitive domain.²²


Intelligence has a contradictory nature because it is nothing more than the interpretation of information. Intelligence is contradictory in several ways: it is often false, inaccurate, and embellished.²³ Therefore, the commander must develop a standard of judgment based on probability, the commander’s combat experience and his analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of all information.

Information requires analysis, synthesis, and evaluation to provide meaning. The meaning the commander gives to the information is what makes it intelligence.²⁴ Intelligence confirms or denies an existing understanding of the enemy which may change over time which is why the commander must be able to evaluate what is true and what is not to determine if a modification or change of plan is required.²⁵

During Clausewitz’s era the primary source of intelligence was human intelligence, like all intelligence disciplines is susceptible to deception. Today’s commander has a wide variety of intelligence collection sources, thus making it all source, the combination allows the commander to confirm or deny information. However, this does not mean that the commander’s standard of judgment and his ability to accurately recognize the contradictory nature of intelligence is less important. An increase in the number of collection sources have significantly increased the contradictory

nature of information. Intelligence inaccuracies remain present today because of the human factor and the limitations of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination methods.²⁶

Clausewitz believed that the commander's understanding of the enemy and his involvement in the analysis of information was a way to reduce the friction, "the countless minor incidents - the kind you never foresee - combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal."²⁷ To counter friction, the commander should possess *coup d'oeil*, "a French term meaning a quick recognition of truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection."²⁸ Coup d'oeil in contemporary military vernacular means intuition. Intuition is gained from study and practice of the profession of arms. Intuitiveness bridges the gap in action.²⁹



Understanding the enemy allows the commander to focus his collection effort so that he gets what he needs to accomplish the mission. The commander's analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of both friendly and threat forces in time, space, and purpose assist him in determining what information is required to achieve his desired end state.

Failure by the commander to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate all that is known about the threat, results in the improper focus of collection assets. In proper intelligence collection focus is a source of friction brought about by a lack of understanding.

Napoleon, like Clausewitz, knew that information was often unreliable which is why Napoleon acted as his own intelligence officer. Napoleon once stated that “in military operations I only consult myself.”³⁰ Napoleon’s direct involvement in the analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of information contributed to his victories.

Napoleon developed probable enemy COAs based on hypothesis that he developed. His plans were based on these hypothesis. To confirm or deny his hypothesis, Napoleon would use spies, exploratory cavalry troops, and agents to confirm or deny his hypothesis. This allowed him to discover what the enemy’s true intentions were as well as their position.³¹ Armed with this information Napoleon could then determine what the enemy was capable of doing relative to their position and his. By understanding the enemy’s tactics and the relationship of their military instrument of power to the economic and political instruments of power, Napoleon could then calculate when, where, and how to maneuver his Grande Armee to achieve a positional advantage over his enemy. Napoleon believed “that nothing is gained in war except by calculation.”³²

Napoleon’s calculations were based on intelligence derived from his collection effort, directed by the general for the general. Commander involvement in the intelligence process was important to Napoleon because he understood that the general was ultimately responsible for applying meaning to what was seen through his own eyes

or the eyes of others. This contributed to the speed and decisiveness of Napoleon's warfare.³³ Napoleon personified the extreme case of commander involvement in the intelligence process. The Army's intelligence analysis process is very similar to Napoleon's, with one significant difference - Napoleon was both the intelligence director and analyst.

Army publications covering the commander's involvement during the intelligence analysis process suggest that the commander, although he is the intelligence director, still has an obligation to function as the chief intelligence analyst.³⁴ The interrelationship of information to the decision-making process and its link to combined arms operations necessitate that the commander develop and sustain the ability to analyze, synthesis, and evaluate information. Napoleon believed in this idea.

Antoine Henri Jomini, a disciple of Napoleon, was another theorist who believed that there was nothing more important to the commander than understanding the enemy. Jomini believed there were two important components to building a battle plan: intelligence and principles of war. Before conducting combat operations the commander must develop a correct estimate of the enemy's character and his usual style of warfare to enable him to determine his own COAs.³⁵

Jomini, like Sun Tzu and Napoleon, employed spies, used cavalry troops, and practiced espionage as ways of obtaining information on the enemy. Jomini analyzed the information gathered from these multiple sources to assist in the formulation of his plans. He too was aware of the contradictory nature of intelligence which is why he never relied on a single source of information to formulate his plans. His involvement in the

information collection effort and analysis process helped him to develop, confirm, and deny his original hypotheses and probabilities concerning the enemy.

Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Jomini accentuated the difference between knowing and understanding the enemy and emphasized the commander's role in the intelligence process. The difference between knowing and understanding the enemy included the commander's knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis and synthesis of information and the commander's involvement

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of Coalition Forces during Operation Desert Storm, provided the Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee with the best definition of the commander's role in seeing the enemy. In response to the sub-committee's question concerning the confusion over battle damage assessments during Operation Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf stated "that the theater commander is the person that, really in the final analysis, has to make the ultimate assessment to apply good military judgment to what he is seeing."³⁶

General Schwarzkopf's definition of the role of the commander in the intelligence process implies that the commander has to do more than focus and direct the intelligence effort. The commander is the senior intelligence analyst. The commander has to assume this role if he is serious about understanding the enemy. "Intelligence predictions and analysis must be grounded in tactical and operational expertise and common sense."³⁷ The commander can combine his tactical expertise, knowledge of soldiers, and familiarity with the profession of arms to understand the enemy.

FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, makes a distinction between information and intelligence. Information becomes intelligence once it is analyzed. So what is the commander's role in the analysis process? According to Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Jomini the commander is the senior analyst.

The authors of Force XXI concepts agree with these theorists. The commander's role in the analysis process is vital to the successful accomplishment of military operations, which is why they believe that commanders at all levels will have to call on their intuitive skills, analytical skills, studies and past experiences to reduce uncertainty on the battlefield.³⁸

Chapter Three: Seeing and Understanding the Enemy and the Execution of

Doctrine.

When I took a decision or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant – and many irrelevant—factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my finger-ends. The enemy I know almost like my own side.

T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), 1933

Army doctrine maintains that initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility are the five basic tenets essential for victory at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.³⁹ Analysis of these five tenets during mission execution has resulted in the Army developing an operational concept which emphasizes seizing the initiative. Seizing the initiative, maintaining momentum, and exploiting success allows the commander to gain a positional advantage over the enemy. This is key to winning the engagement.⁴⁰ Recognizing the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy is vital to seizing the initiative.

FM 100-5, *Operations* (1993), defines initiative as “depleting the enemy’s options, while retaining friendly freedom of action.”⁴¹ According to the 1998 Coordinating Draft of FM 100-5, *Operations*, commanders must maintain focus in order to seize the initiative. Maintaining focus requires commanders to conceptualize and visualize a mission end state, develop the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements, and identify the actions required to force the enemy to accept battle on unfavorable terms.

Seeing the enemy early and detecting enemy weaknesses are important factors to consider when determining enemy intentions and capabilities (the science of tactics), but these factors by themselves do not lead to seizing the initiative.⁴² How well the commander analyzes, synthesizes, and evaluates these factors in relationship to his forces in time, space, and purpose (the art of tactics) assists in determining whether or not the commander gains the initiative. The commander's understanding of the enemy and his forces is important to determining the enemy's vulnerabilities relative to the commander's tactical plan.

The identification of the enemy's vulnerabilities and comprehending the significance of his vulnerabilities in time, space, and purpose in relationship to friendly forces helps the commander determine where, when, and how to mass combat power on the battlefield. Understanding and recognizing the significance of the enemy's vulnerabilities assists the commander in deciding whether or not his plan needs modification.

Analyzing, synthesizing, comprehending, and evaluating enemy activity in light of the commander's designated end state assist in determining how best to identify and attack the enemy within the bounds of the commander's intent. Understanding the enemy helps the commander determine what actions are required to turn enemy actions and vulnerabilities into friendly advantages.⁴³

Seeing the enemy, knowing the enemy's location and strength, helps the commander determine where the enemy has accepted risk and pinpoints potential vulnerabilities. However, when determining where, when, and how to employ his combat

power, the commander has to evaluate the information derived from seeing the enemy in order to determine the relevancy of the information for setting the conditions for seizure of the initiative. Understanding the interrelationship of the threat's culture, military and political organizations, doctrine, TTPs, weapon systems, C4I, and logistical structure is essential to seizing the initiative.⁴⁴

Having the ability to see the enemy's location and knowing his doctrine and TTPs are factors which contribute to understanding the enemy, but when viewed as static "snapshots" in time and space the significance of these factors become hard to discern while engaging a thinking, uncooperative enemy. Peter M. Senge, the author of *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization*, emphasizes systems thinking - "seeing wholes and their interrelationship rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static snapshots as a way to achieve better understanding of complex systems."⁴⁵ There are several characteristics which make the enemy a complex system, the most significant being his ability to quickly adapt to the battlefield situation.⁴⁶

Senge's systems thinking approach aids the commander in gaining and maintaining the initiative because it assists the commander in developing an understanding of the enemy based on the interrelationship of the enemy's components to the entire enemy force. This includes the enemy commander's will and determination. Recognizing and understanding the interrelationship of the components to the whole assists the commander in revealing the enemy's strength, decisive points, and probable points of culmination. These are important in seizing the initiative and anticipating enemy actions.⁴⁷

The Army's "tactical core functions" (FM 100-5 1997): see, shape, strike, and move presupposes that there is a difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy.⁴⁸ To perform these tasks the commander must not only know where the enemy is, he has to understand the threat's components and their linkage to the threat force as a whole to determine which component to attack to help him shape the threat.

Striking the right enemy component causes the enemy to collapse. The enemy's collapse causes him to lose the initiative, thus providing the friendly commander with the opportunity to gain the initiative. Every action has a reaction and if the commander strikes without understanding how his action will affect his intent, his forces, and the enemy the greater the potential exists for the action being counterproductive.⁴⁹

Understanding the enemy is more than knowing information. Seeing the enemy is the first step to understanding the enemy. Seeing and understanding the enemy are important at all levels of war. At the tactical level of war the failure to recognize the difference between the two results in poor mission performance and the loss of soldiers. The following brief case studies demonstrate these ideas.

The ability to see and understand the enemy contributed to both the tactical failure and success of the Army's Task Force Smith and the Marine Corps 1st Marine Division during the Korean War. Albeit, their inability to see and understand the enemy originated at the strategic and operational levels, the case studies will focus on the tactical level by examining the initial engagement of Task Force Smith with the North Korean Peoples

Army (NKPA) and the 1st Marine Division's battle with the Chinese IX Army Group at the Chosin Reservoir.

Task Force Smith

Task Force Smith, a regimental combat team from the 1st Battalion 21st Infantry Regiment 24th Infantry Division, were the first American soldiers to arrive in Korea after the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) attacked south across the border on June 25, 1950. Task Force Smith was to head to Taejon and stop the NKPA as far from Pusan as they could by blocking the main road as far north as possible. This mission would later include supporting the Republic of Korea Army.⁵⁰ Task Force Smith's initial encounter with the NKPA and their failure to gain the initiative set the tone for the war.

As early as 1949 the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG), and South Korean President, Dr. Syngman Rhee, were aware of the NKPA armor capability. The failure of these agencies to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate information concerning the increase in border incidents prior to the NKPA attack and Soviet and Chinese influence on the NKPA prior to the commitment of Task Force Smith and the commander's lack of involvement during the IPB process contributed to Task Force's inability to seize the initiative. Failing to recognize the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy and their relationship to seizing the initiative, coupled with the lack of commander's IPB, contributed to Task Force Smith's poor performance on 5 July 1950.⁵¹

Lieutenant Colonel Smith, the Commander of Task Force Smith, was unaware of the information and order of battle holdings of his higher headquarters because it was not

offered to him. Lieutenant Colonel Smith admitted after the war that “he knew nothing about the Korean situation or what his men and himself were about to get into.”⁵² The commander is responsible for conducting IPB prior to and during the execution of his mission. The failure of his higher headquarters in providing the commander information does not preclude the commander from seeking all available information on the enemy situation.

The failure of Task Force Smith does not rest solely in the hands of the intelligence community as the accounts of the plight of Task Force Smith would suggest. It rests with the lack of command involvement in making the intelligence system work for the commander. Using the contemporary definition of seeing the enemy, Task Force Smith could neither see nor understand the enemy prior to July 5, 1950.

The soldiers of Task Force Smith like their leadership did not understand the enemy. Some soldiers believed that the North Korean Soldiers were similar to the South Koreans in training and equipment and were poorly led. The soldiers of Task Force Smith were unaware of NKPA doctrine, tactics, tank employment methods, and the flanking techniques of the infantry. NKPA armor caught them by surprise.⁵³ The NKPA had the initiative.

1st Lieutenant Philip Day, Jr., a platoon leader in C Company/21st Infantry, saw a column of tanks on 5 July 1950 and asked his platoon sergeant, “What are those?” The response was, “Those are T-34 tanks, sir, and I don’t think they’re going to be friendly toward us.”⁵⁴ The sergeant was correct and Task Force Smith with its 400 soldiers, 75mm recoilless rifles, 4.2mm mortars, 2.36in bazooka rocket launcher teams, and 60mm

mortars were no match for the NKPA combined arms threat. So what did the Army know about the NPKA prior to the commitment of Task Force Smith?

When the NKPA attacked across the border on 25 June 1950, they were supported by 1,400 artillery pieces and 125 Russian made T-34 tanks. General MacArthur assured Washington that this was nothing more than a reconnaissance in force. General MacArthur also believed that the NKPA leaders and soldiers were arrogant and inferior.⁵⁵ When Task Force Smith was alerted on 30 June 1950 it was common knowledge that armor had led the attack and that the Republic of Korea Army had been ineffective against it.⁵⁶

By the time Task Force Smith was committed General MacArthur knew that NKPA forces possessed an armored capability, that they were trained in combined arms operations, and had two divisions who fought with Mao Tse-Tung in his successful take over of China.⁵⁷ So why was it that Task Force Smith was unprepared for its encounter? Certainly, training and leadership were a factor, but the inability to synthesize these facts in relationship to the enemy's components and the environment prevented Task Force Smith from gaining the operational and tactical initiative on 5 July 1950.

Could understanding the enemy have helped Task Force Smith? Yes, at the tactical level understanding the enemy could have resulted in the deployment of tanks and better equipment suitable for combined arms warfare. Also, understanding the influence of Soviet military thought on the NKPA doctrine and tactics could have helped General MacArthur confute his assumptions that the NKPA soldiers and leaders are inferior and arrogant and that Chinese forces are poorly lead.⁵⁸ General MacArthur's planning

assumptions resulted in the piecemeal commitment of the 24th Infantry Division's Task Force Smith and prevented the Army from recognizing that the NPKA and Chinese forces were two different kinds of enemy. Recognizing that they now faced two different types of enemy could have assisted the Army in reevaluating its missions, objectives, and tactics in light of the real enemy versus a perceived enemy.

The NKPA were a vehicle heavy force, moved like conventional forces, and preferred to employ "blitzkrieg" tactics. Knowing and understanding this information could have resulted in Task Force Smith being better equipped, reinforced, or given a more realistic mission other than blocking an armored force with no effective anti-armor capability. Understanding the influence of Chinese manpower, the large quantities of light machine guns, and hand grenades to Chinese tactics could have helped the Army anticipate the shift in enemy tactics prior to needless loss of American casualties in November and December 1950.⁵⁹

This case study indicates that the Army, using the contemporary definition of seeing the enemy, did in fact see the enemy but did not understand the enemy. The military influence of Soviet and Chinese doctrine, TTPs, and equipment and their linkage to the NKPA was not analyzed, synthesized, and evaluated nor comprehended. The lack of commander involvement in the IPB process contributed to the inability of Task Force Smith to gain and maintain the initiative during their initial encounter. The result was failure at the operational and tactical level. At the tactical level, Task Force Smith could not gain the initiative because it did not see nor understand the enemy. Task Force Smith

could not “deplete the enemy’s options, while retaining friendly freedom of action.”⁶⁰

Task Force Smith lost 185 men kill, wounded, or missing.⁶¹

Chosin Reservoir

The 1st Marine Division’s success at the Chosin Reservoir serves as an example of how seeing and understanding the enemy enhances a unit’s ability to seize the initiative. Admittedly, there are some unique differences between the Marine Corps and the Army in organizational structure and TTPs, not to mention that the Marine Corps fought the Chinese and NKPA prior to the Chosin Reservoir. This contributed to understanding the enemy. The 1st Marine Division recognized the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy which helped them modify and adapt their tactics to defeat the Chinese at the Chosin Reservoir.

Prior to the Chosin Reservoir certain facts were known about the Chinese. The Marines knew: the table of organization and equipment of Chinese divisions, they knew the Chinese were superior in personnel, the number of light machine guns and mortars (a major strength of their tactics), they knew how the Chinese attacked, and they were aware of how Mao Tse-Tung conducted the war in China. Even though this information was known throughout the United Nations Command in November of 1950, no official document describing Chinese forces’ TTPs was produced until December of 1950.⁶² The Marines were aware of Chinese tactics prior to the Korean War but would have to figure out a way to seize the tactical initiative.

By November 1950 the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments of the 1st Marine Division realized the difference and interrelationship of seeing and understanding the enemy and

their linkage to seizing the initiative. The 1st Marine Division was aware that Chinese tactics included concentrating on a given point and to keep hitting the point until it was destroyed, thereby, creating a penetration. Once the penetration was made, an exploitation force would attack the rear lines of communication and near-by positions.⁶³ These tactics confirmed what the Marines had learned by observing Mao's Eight Route Army in the 1930s during the Chinese Civil War.

The Marines first hand knowledge of Chinese forces and the lessons learned from previous engagements with Chinese forces in Korea were instrumental in the modification of Marine Corps tactics. The 5th and 7th Marine Regiments modified and adopted their tactics to seize the initiative. They did not retreat under the pressure of enemy attacks, but instead broke contact by steadily increasing pressure on the enemy, their perimeters were larger than company size, and they gathered human intelligence on Chinese build-ups on their flanks and fronts.⁶⁴

In the Battle of Yudau-Ni on 26-28 November 1950, the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments were facing the Chinese IX Army Group whose mission was to destroy the 1st Marine Division. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Ridge, Commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Division knew he was fighting out numbered because of reports he received from Korean refugees. Armed with this information and his combat experience Lieutenant Colonel Ridge developed his course of action.

Ridge believed the Chinese would begin their attack at 9:30 PM, approaching from the southwest and would stay out of artillery range during the day. He used human intelligence to confirm or deny his probable enemy course of action.⁶⁵ Key to defeating

the Chinese were the tactical measures that the Marines employed in preparing their defense and eventual breakout of the Chosin Reservoir. Ridges's forces increased force protection measures and seized the high ground overwatching their perimeter. The high ground was crucial for Chinese success.⁶⁶ Controlling the high ground and understanding the importance of tactical patience enabled the 1st Marine Division to seize the tactical initiative while on the defense at the Chosin Reservoir.

One thousand Marines died or were reported missing and 3,500 were wounded but 25,000 Chinese soldiers died and another 12,000 were wounded during the battle of the Chosin Reservoir.⁶⁷ Although, Chinese forces occupied Yudau-Ni, the Marines made them pay a heavy price. The Marines, while on the defense, prevented the Chinese from seizing the tactical initiative by being prepared for the attack and adapting their TTPs to fit the environment and the enemy's way of war.

The Marines learned that large scale armor operations were not the Chinese tactics of choice based on their abundant manpower resources and the limited but credible armor capability. Therefore, the infantry fire team, the light machine gun, and the grenade were the backbone of their fighting force. The 1st Marine Division's response to the Chinese nature of war emphasized the importance of human intelligence, decreasing the size of the defensive perimeter, while controlling and denying key terrain. The 1st Marine Division, through understanding the difference and interrelationship of seeing and understanding the enemy, developed TTPs that denied the Chinese IX Army Group the tactical initiative. The Chinese IX Army Group was unsuccessful in its attempt to destroy the 1st Marine Division.

Seeing and understanding the enemy applies to all the levels of war and the Korean War serves as an historical example of how a break down at any level can create an untenable situation for forces in battle. Order of battle files existed and even improved during the course of the war but yet United Nations Command Forces did not understand that they were fighting two distinct enemy forces nor did they adapt to the changing battlefield dynamics. Task Force Smith and the 1st Marine Division represent the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy and its importance to battlefield success. If training was an issue for Task Force Smith's preparation for war then, what about today's forces?

The lessons learned at the Army's CTCs indicate that there is a difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), suggests that there are systemic training issues in the force which relate to seeing and understanding the enemy. Some of the systemic problems are: reconnaissance and surveillance planning and execution; designing enemy COAs; actions on contact; the commander's concepts for fires; and direct fire planning refinement.⁶⁸

These training issues clearly show that it is no longer an S2 problem. The training issues listed above are a direct result of the warfighter ignoring the difference and interrelationship of seeing and understanding the enemy. To address these issues warfighters must identify the issues and not the symptoms, determine how they can be fixed and who has operational or tactical control to fix the issue, and lastly, what is the commander's role.

Accentuating the difference and interrelationship of seeing and understanding the enemy will help in trend reversal. Understanding the enemy is linked to all these issues. An examination of each issue will support this premise.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning and Execution

Stating that the R&S plan is not focused on the Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) or that the commander's PIR are too general is not enough. The real issue is whether or not the commander identified the two or three decisions that he has to make during the course of the engagement. Identifying those decisions will assist the commander in determining what information he needs to know and by when. The information that the commander needs to make those decisions becomes his PIR.

The definition of PIR, "those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision-making"⁶⁹, require the commander to have an understanding of both his forces, the enemy, and the terrain in time, space, and purpose. If the PIR are too broad, maybe the commander does not understand the linkage of the PIR to the military decision making process. If the R&S effort is broken perhaps it stems from seeing the enemy through the eyes of another in "snapshot" form versus a complex system.

Designing Enemy COAs

The symptoms in this issue are: enemy COAs are scripts, reflecting "smartbooks" or checklists, they are not dynamic or grounded in the enemy's military theory or science, and often they do not reflect how the enemy sees the friendly forces and COAs.⁷⁰ These symptoms address the fundamental flaw with the contemporary definition of seeing the

enemy which excludes understanding the enemy. Understanding the enemy entails reading, analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating his doctrine and TTPs in light of the commander's intent and the battlefield environment.

Understanding allows the S2 and commander to determine what the enemy commander may consider suitable, feasible, and acceptable within the parameters of resources available. More importantly, understanding identifies the linkage of his components to the entire enemy force which forces us to think of him as a complex adaptive system. The commander has a role in this process.

Understanding and knowing the enemy are essential to designing threat COAs and the commander has both a role and responsibility in their development. Building realistic threat COAs requires the commander and S2 to observe and study the threat's training or combat operations, and understand the threat's procedures.⁷¹ Understanding the threat is essential to identifying threat conditions and this assists in determining how the threat commander could employ his assets based on available resources and the effects of the environment to seize the initiative.

Although the S2 is responsible for developing the threat COA the commander has more tactical experience. The commander's experience and involvement in threat COA development helps the S2 develop a threat COA based on the commander's tactical expertise and his understanding of the threat. If the S2 is responsible for predicting and developing the threat commander's COAs for the war gaming process, who should ensure that the threat COAs are suitable, feasible, acceptable, unique, and consistent with threat doctrine and TTPs prior to the war game?⁷² The commander. The commander performs

these checks on the S3's COAs and even provides guidance to the S3 for the development of friendly COAs, but the commander is normally not involved in threat COA development prior to and during the war gaming session. The commander's input during threat COA development is important. He is a maneuver commander and can assist in the identification of threat branches and sequels as they relate to his own vision of the battlefield.⁷³

Planning Actions on Contact

The recurring issue in this area is that company/teams rarely execute effective actions on contact because commanders do not visualize how the enemy will use combat multipliers to shape and attrit the force and they fail to plan for multiple forms of contact.⁷⁴ This supports the idea that warfighters tend not to think of the enemy as a complex adaptive system made up of several discrete components. The enemy's strengths rests within his ability to use these components to strengthen the whole. It is through understanding the interrelationship of the components to the whole that facilitates exploiting the vulnerabilities of his components to defeat the whole. To ignore the interrelationship will continue to result in units reacting to the enemy's tactical initiative.

Commander's Concept For Fires

Comments from the CTCs concerning concept of fires suggest that the commander has difficulty issuing clear concept for fires. The commander's concept for fires usually fails to consider the enemy order of battle and what critical tasks the commander wanted fire support to accomplish to influence the enemy order of battle.⁷⁵ This issue, like the others, is linked to understanding the enemy and his components. An

understanding of the enemy based on identifying the linkage and interrelationship of the components to the whole could assist the commander in expressing the critical fire support tasks and targets. Understanding the enemy would help the commander identify which enemy components to neutralize, suppress, and destroy in support of his concept of operations.

Direct Fire Planning

Both seeing and understanding the enemy are contributing factors as to why company/teams have difficulty planning and refining direct fires. The 1997 RAND Study, *Company Performance at the National Training Center*, conducted by Bryan W. Hallmark and James C. Crowley, concluded that company/teams overall performance improved during rotations, except for the area of direct fire execution, because few commanders could effectively integrate the terrain, enemy, and friendly factors into a battlefield vision of how they expected the battle to flow well enough to form a direct fire plan.⁷⁶

Hallmark and Crowley's conclusions were based on observing 330 battles involving 74 companies over a one year period. Their observations support CALL's trend analysis on direct fire planning which states that "company/teams tend to develop a scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to find, fix, mass, and distribute fires to kill the enemy."⁷⁷ Understanding of the fundamentals of direct fire planning and an understanding of the enemy are contributing factors to this issue. Understanding how the enemy fights and anticipating the enemy's most probable and dangerous COAs can assist in improving direct fire planning at the company/team level.

Most company/team commanders are aware of enemy weapon systems' capabilities, but determining and visualizing how the enemy commander will employ these systems on the battlefield utilizing the terrain requires more than just knowing capabilities. Analyzing and evaluating weapon systems' capabilities in relationship to the terrain and the enemy's objective will help the company/team commander understand how to defeat the enemy as a system.

Chapter Four: Analysis of technology on our ability to see and understand the enemy.

“Wars are fought by men, not machines.”

FM 100-5, *Operations*, May 1986

Technological exploitation and the search for information dominance are the keys to future battlefield success. Before the Army can exploit technology, in an effort to achieve information dominance, a few questions must be answered: (1) what role does the Army want technology to play on the future battlefield?, (2) how does the Army maintain the proper balance between technology and the human element?, (3) what are the limitations of technology on the future battlefield?, and (4) how will the Army overcome the limitations of technology?

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, has attempted to answer many of these questions but work is still needed in the areas of determining and overcoming technology's limitations on the future battlefield. Focusing on these two issues requires an understanding of both the complexity of automation and the enemy as a system. Both of which possess the human element, chance, fog and friction, and uncertainty.

Proponents of Force XXI suggest that improved battlefield situational awareness is the catalyst for better battlefield performance. However, this view appears to disregard the importance of understanding the enemy. Battlefield situational awareness, “the ability to have accurate and real time information of friendly, enemy, neutral, and noncombatant

locations; a common relevant picture of the battlefield scaled to a specific level of interest and special needs”⁷⁸, does not suggest nor recognize that understanding the enemy is also a link to improved battlefield situational awareness and mission performance.


Force XXI’s failure to recognize the importance and linkage of understanding the enemy to battlefield situational awareness is a step backwards from existing TTP manuals. FM 17-98, *The Scout Platoon*, defines battlefield situational awareness as the ability to maintain a constant and clear mental picture of the tactical situation. It later points out that an understanding of the relationship between events and time are necessary in order to draw conclusions and anticipate events.⁷⁹ Technology provides the Army with the opportunity to observe the enemy but analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of this positional data combined with experience is what will facilitate anticipating future events through deduction.

Systems like the All Source Analysis System, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar, and the U-2 Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System were designed to improve the commander’s ability to see the enemy in time and space. However, the key factor is purpose. This is the one area that these nor any other system can help the commander determine. Understanding information and the enemy is required to judge the effect the enemy will have on the commander’s intent and purpose.

Technology provides the means to collect, process, and disseminate information in an unprecedented manner but these advantages are quickly negated without understanding the significance of this information in relationship to time, space, and purpose.⁸⁰ More does not necessarily mean better. Even if you are capable of acquiring

more information on the enemy then before, this does not necessarily mean that you automatically understand the enemy. Information is not intelligence.⁸¹ More information is meaningless without an understanding of the enemy.

Technology is supposed to help improve battlefield situational awareness which in turn should decrease uncertainty on the battlefield. Technology does not guarantee certainty.⁸² FM 100-5, *Operations* (proposed final draft), suggests that there are four technology induced levels of uncertainty. They are: data, information, knowledge, and understanding. There will always be uncertainty as to the facts (information), what is being observed (data), what to infer from known facts and observation (knowledge), and uncertainty as to the outcome of actions (understanding).⁸³ The ability to derive understanding from data, information, and knowledge is what will help the commander determine what is relevant and what is not, what he needs to know versus what is irrelevant, and where to focus instead of focusing everywhere.



The Cognitive Hierarchy and the Art of Operations⁸⁴

Technology improves battlefield situational awareness by providing data (positional) but this newly found data brings with it an increase in uncertainty. Uncertainty about the reliability of the information and how much you do not know about the subject or enemy. These two types of uncertainty produces information paralysis, the need for more information before a decision can be made.⁸⁵

Dealing with uncertainty requires first recognizing that no matter what you do, uncertainty will always be present on the battlefield and recognizing that one can never know all there is to know. The best that can be hoped for is to reduce the impact of uncertainty on operations, which is what Martin Van Creveld meant when he stated, "the essence of command is the ability to cope with uncertainty."⁸⁶ There is a belief in the Army that technology is the weapon of choice to reduce uncertainty. Understanding based on experience, studies, knowledge, training, and instinct or coup d'oeil, is truly what reduces uncertainty.

Chapter Five: Conclusions

Successful military operations are characterized by the commander's ability to understand the enemy in terms of time, space, and purpose. The contemporary definition of seeing the enemy focuses on knowing enemy capabilities and limitations with little emphasis on understanding. Seeing the enemy is the first step to understanding the enemy. The commander's ability to recognize that seeing and understanding are different and that they are both linked to mission execution will determine how well the unit performs on the future battlefield. The fundamental difference between seeing and understanding is that understanding requires a person to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate information.

Sun Tzu, Jomini, Clausewitz, and Napoleon accentuated the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy and emphasized the commander's role in the intelligence process. The difference between seeing and understanding the enemy includes the commander's knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, and synthesis of information and the commander's involvement. Today's contemporary definition incorporates all these processes under "knowing".

There is a difference between seeing and understanding the enemy. Army publications profess that seeing the enemy is enough. Definitions or descriptions of seeing the enemy which omit the words analyze, synthesize, and evaluate downplay the difference and interrelationship of understanding to seeing the enemy. The Army's battle command tenets - judgment and intuition support their inclusion.

In the absence of facts, information, and perfect intelligence, the commander is required to make a decision on the basis of his understanding of the tactical situation. Understanding requires critical thinking and emerges from applying experience and studies to information. How well the commander sees the enemy in time, space, and purpose is dependent upon how well the commander understands the enemy.

Army war fighting doctrine expects commanders to recognize the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy and realize its impact on mission execution. Recognizing the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy is vital to seizing the initiative. Understanding and recognizing the significance of the enemy's vulnerabilities in light of the commander's intent and designated end state assist in determining where, when, and how to mass combat power on the battlefield.

The Army's Task Force Smith and the Marine Corps' 1st Marine Division had to suffer defeat before victory in order to learn the importance of understanding the enemy and its linkage to seeing the enemy. Task Force Smith was short on time, training, and leadership was no match for the NKPA. Consequently, they were unsuccessful in seizing the tactical initiative. Task Force Smith could not gain the initiative because they could neither see nor understand the enemy.

The 1st Marine Division, on the other hand, had time to learn from their Chinese and NKPA engagements prior to Chosin Reservoir. Having learned from their mistakes, the Marines modified and adapted their tactics to fit the environment and the enemy. This enabled them to deny the Chinese IX Army Group the tactical initiative at Chosin Reservoir. The Marines realized that the infantry fire team, the light machine gun, and

the grenade were the backbone of the Chinese fighting force. The Marines understanding of the enemy as a system coupled with an appreciation of the terrain helped the Marines understand the nature of the enemy. This was something that technology could not do.

There is no doubt that technology and information operations will become important factors in future warfare, but they will never replace the human element of war. In an effort to improve battlefield situational awareness - the catalyst for better battlefield performance, the Army must not forget that battlefield situational awareness is not a panacea for success. Force XXI proponents have taken a step backward from existing doctrine by failing to acknowledge the importance and linkage of understanding the enemy to battlefield situational awareness. Technology provides the Army with the opportunity to observe the enemy better than before but analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of this positional data combined with experience is what facilitates understanding the enemy and anticipating future events.

Technology provides the means to collect, process, and disseminate information like never before but these advantages are negated when the commander is flooded with data. Controlling the influx of data requires us to begin to look at the enemy as a complex adaptive system versus a "simple compound". Understanding the relationship of the components to the whole will enable commanders to develop better Commander's Critical Information Requirements and improve R&S planning and execution, direct fire planning, commander's concept for fires, and threat enemy COAs.

Doctrinal enemy templates are a thing of the past. Today's potential threat could appear anywhere in the world. Mission requirements dictate that soldiers and officers

possess the ability to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate information based on their studies and experience to understand the potential threat. Understanding the enemy allows the commander to “fill in the blanks” left by the absence of perfect information.

Endnotes

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- ¹ J.F.C Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, (New York, New York: DA Capo Press, 1992), pp.45-46.
- ² "Command means visualizing the current and future state of enemy and friendly forces and then formulating concepts of operations to accomplish the mission." FM 100-5, Operations. Department of the Army, Washington D.C, 1993.
- ³ Battle Command (DRAFT 2.1): "Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: April 1994), p. 38.
- ⁴ Martin Van Creveld, Command In War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 68.
- ⁵ Battle Command, p. 13.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 38.
- ⁷ Webster's Third New International Dictionary, (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1976), 1252.
- ⁸ Battle Command, p. 48. See Benjamin S. Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, (Longman, New York: Longman, 1984), p. 62.
- ⁹ Benjamin S. Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, (Longman, New York: Longman, 1984), p p. 188-189.
- ¹⁰ Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 2490.
- ¹¹ Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, pp. 62-206.
- ¹² Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-100-1, "Leadership and Command on the Battlefield". (Fort Monroe, VA, 1992), p. 13.
- ¹³ Battle Command, p. 58 and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-100-1, p. 13. See TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, "Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century," pp. 3-4 through 3-6. Both pamphlets agree that the commander must exhibit intuitive skills to determine if and when decisions have to be made. That waiting on information or more analysis leads to hesitation which yields the initiative and momentum to the enemy.
- ¹⁴ Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, pp. 188-189.
- ¹⁵ Field Manual 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook On Intelligence, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1992), p.2-5 and Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994), p. B-4 through B-5 for a detailed description of techniques for training analysis w tactics.
- ¹⁶ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Ralph D. Sawyer, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 134.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 231.
- ¹⁸ Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, "Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century". (Fort Monroe,

VA, 1994), Glossary -6 and Field Manual 17-98, Scout Platoon Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994), p. 2-24.

¹⁹ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 132-134.

²⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. And trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 117.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, p. figure 1.

²³ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 117.

²⁴ Field Manual 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook On Intelligence, p.1-2 and Field Manual 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), p. 1-1 for distinction between information and intelligence .

²⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 117-118.

²⁶ Colonel Steven A. Epkins, "A G2's Perspective on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), pp. 26-28. Predictive Analysis was a significant problem for the 82d Airborne Division due to limited expertise displayed by analysts and the volume of message traffic received. The 82d Airborne Division received 420 messages daily. The message total was well over 100,000 from August 1990 through March 1991.

²⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 119.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, p. 3-4 and Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-100-1, p. 13.

³⁰ J.F.C Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, p.45 and Martin Van Creveld, Command In War, p. 67.

³¹ Ibid., p. 47-48.

³² Ibid.

³³ Martin Van Creveld, Command In War, p. 67.

³⁴ See Field Manual 34-8, p.1-2 and Field Manual 34-3, p. 1-8. Also Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, p. 3-4 and Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-100-1, p. 13

³⁵ Baron de Jomini, ed .by BG J.D. Hittle, The Art of War. In Roots of Strategy Book 2, (Harrison, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), p. 511.

³⁶ United States Congress. "Intelligence Success and Failures in Operation Desert Shield/Storm Report of the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee and Investigation Subcommittee 103rd Congress 1st Session," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 29.

³⁷ Field Manual 34-8, p.1-2.

³⁸ Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, p. 3-4.

³⁹ Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993), pp. 2-6 through 2-9.

⁴⁰ Field Manual 100-40, Tactics, (Revised Initial Draft 7 June 1997), (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1997), p. 1-4 and Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (1997 Coordinating Draft), (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 5 August 1997), p. 3-1 through p. 4-1. These documents are under development and are not approved doctrine.

⁴¹ Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993), p. 2-6 and Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (1997 Coordinating Draft), (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 5 August 1997), p. 7-1. The material in this document is under development and is not approved doctrine.

⁴² Field Manual 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, March 1990), p. 1-2.

⁴³ Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (1997 Coordinating Draft), p. 7-1. The material in this document is under development and is not approved doctrine.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), pp. 68-73.

⁴⁶ See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure, (New York, New York: Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company, Inc, 1989), pp. 71-106; Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, p. 68-73; and M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, (New York, New York: Touchstone Books, 1992), pp. 293-298 for a detailed explanation on the ability of complex systems to adapt to environmental stimuli.

⁴⁷ Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (1997 Coordinating Draft), pp. 9-3 through 9-9. The material in this document is under development and is not approved doctrine.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 5-1 through 5-9.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, 1961, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History U.S.A., 1986), p. 61. This is the second volume that was heavily resourced in providing an understanding of the Korean War series of the Department of the Army's Center for Military History.

⁵¹ Richard E. Matthews, Task Force Smith—An Intelligence Failure, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 14 December 1995), pp. 13-19.

⁵² Ibid. p. 33. Also see Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War, (New York, New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 161-195 for a description of the failures associated with the Korean debacle.

⁵³ Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 11.

⁵⁴ Donald Knox, The Korean War, An Oral History Osan to Chosin, (New York, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985), pp. 18-19.

⁵⁵ Michael Lee Lanning, Senseless Military Secrets, (New York, New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1996), p. 221 and pp. 228-234.

⁵⁶ Richard E. Matthews, Task Force Smith—An Intelligence Failure, p. 31 and Michael Lee Lanning, Senseless Military Secrets, p. 232.

⁵⁷ Michael Lee Lanning, Senseless Military Secrets, pp. 227-236.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War, pp. 176-177.

⁶⁰ See Roy E. Appleman, Disaster in Korea, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1982), pp. 12-19 for effectiveness of aerial observation on Chinese troop movements and Field Manual 100-5, p. 2-6 for a detailed definition of initiative.

⁶¹ Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 76 and Richard Matthews, Task Force Smith - An Intelligence Failure, p. 37.

⁶² Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War, p. 176.

⁶³ Roy E. Appleman, Escaping the Trap, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), p. 64 and Appleman, East of the Chosin, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1987) pp. 57-133.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 193.

⁶⁵ Ibid, pp. 161-162 and Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War, p. 186, for an overview of the 1st Marine Division actions during the battle at the Chosin Reservoir. Also Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost, (New York, New York: Hippocrene Books, 1987), pp. 340-368 for an account of the 1st Marine Divisions encounters with the Chinese IX Army Group at the Chosin Reservoir.

⁶⁶ Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War, p. 187 and Roy E. Appleman, Escaping the Trap, p. 63.

⁶⁷ Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War, p. 186

⁶⁸ National Training Center Priority Trends: "A Compendium of Trends, with Techniques and Procedures that Work," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 4th QTR FY 94 through 2nd QTR FY 96), pp. N-1 through N-18.

⁶⁹ Field Manual 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, p. 2-2 ; Field Manual 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), and John F. Lady, "To Link or Not to Link". Military Intelligence Professional Magazine, July - September 1995. pp. 6-8.

⁷⁰ Combat Training Center Trends: NTC, 1st Quarter & 2nd Quarters FY 96, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center For Army Lessons Learned, FY 96), pp. II-1 through II-8.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. B-4

⁷² Ibid., p. 2-42.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 2-39.

⁷⁴ See National Training Center Priority Trends: "A Compendium of Trends, with Techniques and Procedures that Work", pp. N-11 through N-18; Combat Training Center Trends: NTC, 3rd Quarter & 4th Quarters FY 96, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center For Army Lessons Learned, FY 96) pp. II-7 through II-9 and Combat Training Center Trends: NTC, 4th Quarter FY 96 & 1st Quarters FY 97, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center For Army Lessons Learned, No 97-6) p. II-7 through II-8 for a detailed explanation of direct fire planning and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

⁷⁵ Combat Training Center Trends: NTC, 1st Quarter & 2nd Quarters FY 96, p. II-50.

⁷⁶ Bryan Hallmark and James C. Crowley, Company Performance at the National Training Center: Battle Planning and Execution, (Santa Monica California: RAND, 1997), pp. 48-49.

⁷⁷ Combat Training Center Trends: NTC, 3rd Quarter & 4th Quarters FY 96, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center For Army Lessons Learned, FY 96) pp. II-8 through II-9..

⁷⁸ Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, p. Glossary 7.

⁷⁹ Field Manual 17-98, The Scout Platoon, p. 2-24.

⁸⁰ BG Morris J. Boyd and MAJ Michael Woodgard, "Information Operations: Force XXI Operations." Military Review, November 1994, pp. 17-24.

⁸¹ Anthony M. Coroalles, "On War. In the Information Age: A Conversation with Carl Von Clausewitz," Army Magazine, May 1996, p.34.

⁸² Jack R. Brown, Force XXI -- Heavy Task Force Battle Command Dynamics, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, 14 December 1995), p. 9.

⁸³ Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1997 Coordinating Draft), pp.19-4 through 19-5. The material in this document is under development and is not approved doctrine.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 19-2.

⁸⁵ Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure, pp. 98-105.

⁸⁶ Martin Van Creveld, Command In War, pp. 264 through 275.

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